Tag Archives: Brexit

The myth of “no deal” Brexit

Four years ago, most people in Britain never gave a thought to the European Union.

They could not name a European law which had made their lives more difficult, they were happy to be able to travel freely around Europe, and that there were enough people to run our NHS, to care for our old people, and pick our fruit and vegetables, they could not name a single European law which made their lives more difficult, and they were content that £1 a week of their taxes was spent on our membership of the EU.

Then, to try to end a long running quarrel in the Tory Party, David Cameron decided to crush the Europhobe minority of his Party by proving that the British people were happy with this situation.

The people were angry about a lot of things – austerity, cuts to public services, falling real wages, rising crime, homelessness, food banks, potholes, queues in the NHS. None of these had anything to do with the EU. In one or two cases, the EU was actually helping.

But people were told that these problems were the fault of the politicians, and that leaving the EU would make these things better. Politicians told them to vote remain, so they voted leave

Since then we have become a deeply divided society over something that almost nobody cared about, and most people didn’t understand. And our country, of which I used to be proud, has become a laughing stock around the world.

So it’s no wonder that the only thing we now agree about is that we want it all to be over. That is why so many people would vote for leaving with “no deal” as soon as possible.

But just as leaving the EU will not deal with potholes in Norfolk, so leaving with no deal will not stop the debate about our relationship with the EU.

No deal is an illusion. We cannot survive without working relationships with our nearest neighbours. So after a “no deal” exit our government would have to go back to Brussels to ask them to open negotiations: on cooperation on crime, on how to avoid civil war in Ireland, on how to maintain free trade and shared standards for food and medicines, on citizen’s rights, on licensing of air traffic and professional qualifications. And they will be happy to negotiate, provided we first sign up to the things which our government agreed to, and Parliament rejected.

So no deal is groundhog day. It means starting the whole awful process of the last three years again, just from a weaker position. We will spend billions on bailing out businesses damaged by Brexit. We will see the flow of businesses moving out of the UK grow as they despair of our ever reaching a solution. Every commentator (including the pro-leave economists, and the Government) agrees that we will be poorer. We will still have 14,000 civil servants working on Brexit rather than our real problems. Our politics and government will continue to have no time for the country’s real problems.

It is time to be honest with the people – no deal is not a solution, it is not “getting it over with”, it is restarting the whole awful mess.

There are really only two choices – a possible agreement on how to leave the EU, carefully negotiated over three painful years, or sticking with the deal we had four years ago, membership of the EU, on terms more generous than any other country has. Four years ago the overwhelming majority were content with the deal we have.

We need to ask the people – how will your life be better if we leave? Is that worth the price of more years of political division, and a government too busy with Brexit to be able work on our real problems.

No deal is no answer – its time to ask the people.

Repairing a broken constitution

Is the system broken?

There is wide agreement that our political system is broken.  Because Parliament accurately reflects the confusion and division in the country on the most pressing political issue of a generation, it is incapable of rational decision making, and has clearly lost the confidence of the electorate. For three years it has been unable to legislate on that, or any of the other major issues facing the country. A referendum called to resolve an internal dispute in one party has divided the nation and undermined trust in democracy. Our electoral system has been challenged by special interests, and the institutions which exist to police them[1] have proved incapable of doing so. First past the post elections continue to give very great power to parties with no clear majority[2]. Our constitution allows the paid up members of one political party to choose a Prime Minister, even when those members are deeply unrepresentative of the electorate as a whole. Once in post, that Prime Minister can appoint a strongly partisan government, and has absolutely no obligation to seek a renewed mandate for his or her agenda from the electorate.

This is wrong, and undemocratic, and it is not surprising that people are angry, despairing, or have simply given up hope in politics. Some believe that leaving the European Union will be an economic, political and constitutional disaster. Others believe that to fail to do so would be to finally undermine democracy itself. Conflicts of reason and emotion provide a dangerous cocktail of argument which cedes power to those with the loudest voices.

Could an election or referendum resolve the problem?

There is now talk of a government of national unity, or a new minority government with a remit to delay the Brexit process to allow a new referendum on Brexit. However, the best available evidence is that another referendum would produce further anger and division, with a similarly small majority in favour of remaining in the EU. Acting on that would arouse serious anger and mistrust in the democratic process, but failing to do so would create similar anger on the part of the half of the population who still want to remain. It would not resolve the difficulty that the four nations of the Union are likely to vote strongly in different ways. Similarly, a general election is unlikely to give a clear answer to the Brexit question, since the country is deeply divided, the two traditionally major parties are both divided on Brexit, and a host of other issues will also come into play. Opinion polls, and the European Parliament election result, suggest that an election would produce another hung Parliament, even more divided than the present one.

In most electoral systems worldwide a major constitutional change like Brexit is only carried out if a supermajority votes for it. Otherwise, the status quo is upheld. The supermajority can be a majority of voters (60%, two thirds or even more) or an absolute majority of the electorate. By any such test, the 2016 referendum would have failed. However, given that we have had a referendum, albeit with a very narrow result, it is not clear what the “status quo” would be: another recipe for conflict.

An alternative plan

We clearly need a way of dealing with the two deeply intertwined issues of Brexit and constitutional reform. They need to be considered at the same time because, if Brexit happens, government will be embroiled in international negotiation over trade and many other issues for years to come, with no time or inclination to consider constitutional (or any other) issues, and the problems will only grow. However, if there is no clear route through which the goal of those who voted leave can be achieved, then they would be entitled to suspect a plot to invalidate the previous decision.

I therefore propose a radical strategy which seeks to deal with both issues at the same time, and with the current divided, but broadly representative, Parliament. It comprises four elements:

  1. A caretaker government of national unity should be created from the current Parliament, to serve no longer than May 2021 (the date of the next general election under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act).  Whether it is formed by a cross party collaboration led by an acceptable backbench MP, or by one of the opposition parties, it must be agreed that during that period there will be no major policy change or legislation which does not command the support of a specified proportion of MPs (perhaps two thirds?). This can reassure members of all parties that supporting the national unity government will not allow one party to impose partisan policies.
  2. The government should immediately request an extension to the Article 50 notice for two years to carry out a constitutional review and a referendum.
  3. The government should immediately legislate to create one or more representative citizens assemblies to consider the UK’s relationship with the EU, and to make recommendations with a specified deadline, and to authorise a referendum
  4. That government should immediately convene a constitutional convention to consider and make recommendations to Parliament on the following issues (which need to be considered together, since they interact in many complex ways):
    • The extent and nature of devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and  the place of England in the Union
    • The conduct of a further referendum on Europe
    • The future use (if any) of referenda: what issues are appropriate for referenda, whether they should be outlawed altogether, or governed by a supermajority
    • A more proportional electoral system to ensure that members of the electorate can realistically believe that their votes count
    • The reduction of the voting age to 16
    • The reform of electoral law, including the regulation of media coverage and online campaigning, the institutions for policing breaches of that law, and the penalties for doing so.
    • The possible repeal of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act.
  5. In the light of the recommendations of the Constitutional Convention the government should bring to Parliament a Constitution Bill, addressing the issues in 4 above. The aim should be to have such legislation in place before the next planned General Election in May 2021.

Is this realistic?

It will be argued that we cannot afford the luxury of two years of navel gazing: there are too many important issues to face. I believe that there is no better alternative. It is clear that our political system cannot arrive at agreement on how to deal with any of these issues. The most we can expect from an election or referendum now would be to give one party or another a sufficient majority to impose divisive policies on a sceptical electorate. Restoring confidence in democracy requires an overhaul of the system, nor merely rerunning the failed machine.


[1] The Electoral Commission has said that its powers are no longer fit for purpose, and the police have failed to pursue alleged breaches of the law.

[2] In 1983 a 42% vote share gave Margaret Thatcher a majority of over 70. In 2017 the same vote share left Theresa May 2 seats short of any majority at all. A mere 533 votes in nine key constituencies would have given her a clear majority.

Taking back control?

Few people question that Britain faces major economic and social problems – falling living standards, housing shortages, poor quality jobs and unemployment, declining public services, a health service in trouble, low productivity and industrial decline. However, the responsibility for most of these rests with the UK Government, not the EU. Yet Brexit means giving more control to the Governments which have made the mess.

The Government has claimed that Brexit, and specifically the withdrawal agreement agreed in late 2018, will result in Britain “taking back control of our laws, money and borders”.  In reality, “control” means rejecting laws which we have agreed to, spending money we have not got, and controlling our borders in ways which will damage our economy and public services, and our international reputation.

Giving back control to the Governments which made the mess

Brexit means that UK governments, which have allowed the economic and social problems to develop, will have the power to make their own laws and regulations independently of the EU. Their record of solving these problems is not good.

In making those laws we will not become “independent” because we will still have to abide by international laws and treaties, including the rules of the World Trade Organisation and any agreement we make with the EU, and we will have to agree how to deal with legal disputes about interpreting those laws.

Rejecting laws which we agree with

Most UK law is made by Parliament, without any influence from the EU.

Estimates of how many UK laws are influenced by the EU vary from 15-50%. The higher figure includes many very specific and technical regulations, only affecting a specific industry (e.g. “classification of padded waistcoats”, which is important to some clothing manufacturers, but not the average voter). https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/RP10-62#fullreport

There are hardly any EU laws which the UK Government has opposed. Since 1999, the UK Government has voted against EU laws on only 56 of 2,592 occasions (2%). In some of these cases, the UK Members of the European Parliament voted against the UK Government.

The biggest area of EU legal influence is agriculture (the Common Agricultural Policy accounts for 42% of all EU laws and regulations). The interpretation and application of the rules in the UK is carried out by the UK Government. The CAP accounts for 55% of all UK farm income £4 Billion pa in total. The Government has promised to replace this during a transition period, but has made no guarantees beyond that. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/common-agricultural-policy

Losing our money

The UK Government agreed the current level of contributions to the EU budget, using a formula agreed between the 28 Member States. Our Government has a full voice in those negotiations, and in the past negotiated a unique “rebate” for the UK, currently worth £5B.

The total cost of Brexit is currently around £30 billion a year, nearly four times our contribution to the EU budget. The costs are in reduced economic growth, the promised continuation of subsidies for agriculture, and the cost of employing additional staff (including civil servants, trade negotiators, and Border Force staff).

To put the various costs in proportion:

  • the “Brexit Dividend” proposed by the leave campaign during the referendum was £13 billion pa, or £4.17 per person per week
  • the actual current UK contribution to the EU budget is £8 billion pa, or £2.85 per person per week
  • the cost of reduced economic growth since the referendum has been £26 billion, or £8 per person per week
  • The long term cost in reduced economic growth of the most optimistic model of Brexit as assessed by the Treasury (the “Norway/EEA” model) is £20 billion pa, or £21.15 per person per week (Their other models – a negotiated deal or WTO terms – produce substantially higher costs)
  • the cost of the Government’s promise to continue agricultural subsidies is £4 billion, or £1.17 per person per week[1].
  • or comparison, the cost of the NHS (for comparison) is £145 billion, or £46 per person per week

Even before Brexit takes place, the effect of the referendum has been to lose more than the promised “Brexit Dividend”.

Not controlling our borders

The UK government is not good at controlling migrant numbers (leaving aside whether it is desirable to do so, on which people disagree).

At present, the EU accounts for only one third of net migration into the UK. The Government imposes strict rules on non-EU migration, but this number is now at its highest for 14 years. Since the Coalition came to power in 2010, and decided to reduce numbers, the net figures for EU and non-EU have both risen by 43,000 a year. https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/statistics-net-migration-statistics/#create-graph

“Freedom of movement”, which allows any EU citizen (including UK ones) to move freely across the whole of the EU is not unlimited:

  • The UK is not in the Schengen accord, which abolished border controls among the states which signed up to it.
  • The UK still controls its borders, checking the identity of travellers and the purpose of visits from EU countries
  • The UK Government has chosen not to use the rules which exist. Under EU law, anyone who moves to another member state for work can be required to leave if they have not found work within three months.

The Government’s proposals for a new immigration policy would allow free immigration for people earning over £30,000 a year. This would bar most EU citizens working here in the NHS (nurses, care workers etc), in hotels and catering, and in agriculture and food processing. All these are areas where we already have a shortage of workers.


[1] The UK’s net contribution to the EU budget (ONS https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/articles/theukcontributiontotheeubudget/2017-10-31 ).
Spending on the NHS of https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/UK-Government-Expenditure-2016-17.jpg

Since the referendum the UK’s growth rate has fallen (from the fastest in the EU to the slowest). https://www.cer.eu/insights/cost-brexit-june-2018

Britain’s Political Clans and Brexit

A new study by BMG research and researchers at the University of Manchester[1], suggests that it is possible to group the UK electorate into 10 distinct values based “clans”, and that these “clan” identities provide a better explanation of voting behaviour in 2015, 2017 and the Brexit referendum, than traditional left/right, social class or demographic factors.  The research is based on survey evidence from 27,000 people, who responded to 27 values based questions.

The argument is that values, which may be unconscious, and which are linked to people’s emotions, serve as decision-making shortcuts or standards for evaluating actions, policies, people and events. They are thus the underlying drivers of voting behaviour, perhaps taking precedence over “rational” weighing of costs and benefits.

This fits with the widespread observation that voting behaviour in the EU Referendum, and much of the subsequent political debate on Brexit, is emotional, and that attitudes to Brexit and subsequent developments are surprisingly uninfluenced by changing evidence. It has also been observed that, while 31% of the electorate say that are not supporters of any political party, only 10% do not define themselves as “leavers” or “remainers” on the Brexit issue[2] (and 44% say that they are “very strong” “remainers” or “leavers”).

The paper also argues that the “clan” approach more accurately represents the political realities, which are masked by traditional binary analyses. For example, “left v right” misrepresents a much more complex reality, where, for example, people may simultaneously hold left wing economic, and right wing social, views. They demonstrate that in the 2015 and 2017 elections and the Brexit referendum, clan membership was a more accurate predictor of voting behaviour than socio-economic group.

Six clans, which account for two thirds of the electorate, are strongly associated with leave or remain positions. Because their positions are rooted in fundamental values, they are the least likely to change their views.

  • “Remainers”: In three clans the clear majority of members voted remain (by 39, 67 and 82%). These three clans represent 30% of the electorate, and their values are international, broadly left wing on social policy and relaxed/positive about migration.
  • “Leavers”: In three clans a clear majority voted leave (by 50, 66, and 69%). These three clans represent 33% of the electorate, and support a small state, feel strongly about British institutions and are conservative on social issues. Some have socialist views on the economy, but they are opposed to migration and multiculturalism.

In terms of future policy, it is the other four clans whose positions are most interesting, although they are the least interested in politics. Nevertheless they form the battleground for any new referendum campaign:

NHS – “Notting Hill Society” (10% of the electorate: 52:48% for remain).

The most pro-business of all clans. Mixing a modern form of conservatism (associated with Cameron and Osborne) on the environment and society, with traditional views on family life and British institutions. Relatively positive on migration and multiculturalism. This is the oldest of these four clans (the leave associated clans are all rather older).

For the NHS clan, the key issues probably relate to the impact of Brexit on business and trade, and the impact on environmental regulation.

MWL – “Modern Working Life” (7%: 52:48% for remain))

Strong believers in the value of hard work and social mobility, supporting the view that it is always possible to achieve your goals, so long as you work hard. They tend to adopt left-of-centre economic values, but on balance they believe individuals, not others, should be responsible for their own financial well-being, and tend to hold liberal views on the environment, LGBT rights and gender equality. They are also moderately positive about immigration. This is the youngest clan and the one who swung dramatically from Conservative to Labour in the 2017 election (by 21%).

For the MWL clan, the key arguments are likely to be around social (and perhaps geographical) mobility, the opportunities to work and issues of environment and equality.

SAR – “Strength, Agreeable & Respect” (9%: 58:42% for leave)

These tend to favour authority and discipline, leaning in favour of a ‘just desserts’ approach to crime and punishment, and a tendency to favour authority and discipline in various areas of public policy, including defence, human rights and the justice system. They have a preference for a strong and often uncompromising state, which extends to areas such as defence and Britain’s place in the world. Mixed views on most other areas of social and economic policy.

For the SAR clan, the key arguments are likely to be around defence and security, and Britain’s place in the world.

APY – Apathy (10%: 52:48% for leave)

Generally uninterested and disengaged from politics, with very few strong views on many issues. They are unlikely to have given much thought to most economic, political and societal questions, either because they are simply not interested, or because they feel alienated by the current state of our politics.

This clan are least likely to turnout for any future referendum, and it is difficult to identify what issues might change this. However, they should not be ignored since, in the 2016 Referendum, a significant number of people who had never voted before chose to do so, perhaps because in a referendum every vote counts (unlike most votes under the normal UK “first past the post” electoral system).

 

[1] https://www.bmgresearch.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/CONFIDENTIAL_FRACTURED_POLITICS_TURNER_M_ET_AL_2018_V4.pdf

[2] http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/10/23/remainer-or-leaver-the-emergence-of-the-brexit-identity-prism/

Is Labour running out of time on Brexit

The Labour Party strategy on Brexit is to wait to see the deal which the government negotiates with the EU, measure it against the “six tests”, and decide whether to support it. This maximises confusion in the Conservative Party and the prospect of a General Election. However, I believe that time is running out, the prospects of an election are very thin, and the Party should be taking a stronger and more public line.

The six tests were all proposed by leading leave campaigners, but it is clear that no possible Brexit agreement can meet them. So the Party will vote against the government’s deal when it comes to Parliament. However, since the Conservatives, with the DUP, have an absolute majority, we will lose and it will go ahead. If there are any rebels, they are likely to cancel each other out. The result will probably be bad, and the Conservatives will have to take the blame, but by then Brexit will be over.

The Labour hope is that the Conservative Party will implode over this, leading to a General Election and a Labour government. However, losing the vote in Parliament does not bring down the government. Under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act a General Election is only called by a two thirds majority for a motion in the Commons, or if the government lose a vote of no confidence and no other leader can form a government. Either way, Labour strategy relies on Tory rebels, voting in the knowledge that they are probably putting Jeremy Corbyn in No 10, and I don’t believe that even the most rabid Brexiters will risk that. That is the gamble that Theresa May has made, and I think she will win.

Meanwhile, the clock ticks on. At the end of March next year we will crash out of the EU unless one of three things happens:

  • A deal is agreed. The most likely deal now is going to be a version of the Norway agreement. People will be told that it is “real” Brexit, and many will accept that. However, it will not satisfy hard Brexiters, nor those Remainers who care about the UK’s votes and influence.
  • The Article 50 notice is withdrawn. This is legally possible, but Parliament is unlikely to risk doing this for fear of appearing to defy “the will of the people”, unless a referendum has given authority.
  • The EU agree to an extension of the Article 50 period This is only likely to be acceptable to the EU if they can see a prospect that we might decide to remain.

Virtually all MPs, and all interested parties in the UK and the rest of the EU agree that crashing out would be catastrophic, but the UK government claims to be preparing for it, and some commentators in Europe are beginning to think it is the only, or simplest, solution (since they already have systems in place for working with third countries).
The longer this takes, the less likely a deal (including remaining in the EU) is. There are a number of severe constraints:

  • There are 8 months left (including the dead summer holiday period, the party conference season and Christmas).
  • The EU says that 6 months are needed for ratification of any deal by the 30+ Parliaments and the institutions of the EU.
  • A UK General Election requires weeks of preparation, and is difficult to hold in mid-winter.
  • A Referendum requires at least two months for campaigning.
  • In May there are elections for the European Parliament. The UK’s seats have already been distributed among the 27. Withdrawing Article 50 would severely disrupt the process.

Theresa May is gambling that the threat of a Corbyn government will, in the end, keep her MPs in line, and that if she drags the process out long enough, the only feasible option will be to accept a soft, Norway style deal. By delaying taking a clear stand, Labour risks us falling into that by default. Is that what we believe is best for the country, and the people?

The Labour Party position on Brexit

On 19th May, Keir Starmer, Shadow Secretary of State for Brexit spoke at the Fabian Society Summer Conference. I found this the clearest and most explicable account I have read of the Labour Party’s position, and for the first time I felt I understood the logic behind it – even if I disagree with it.
The key points are that the Labour Party:

– is concentrating on supporting the Lords amendments which give control back to Parliament.
– remains committed to its six tests of the Brexit deal (all of which have been promised by Theresa May), and will vote against the motion to approve the deal if it fails to meet them.
– is not supporting the People’s Vote campaign, because the timescales make it impractical, and polling suggests it might deliver a divisive and inconclusive result.

However, nothing is ruled out, since things can change rapidly.

My full note is at: The Labour position Fabians May 18 web

What next on Brexit?

During the last year, my thinking about our relationship with the European Union has been evolving. I remain convinced that leaving is a major act of political, social, and economic self harm (in that order), which will damage most many of those who voted to leave. This is a (long) account of my views. I have written it against the background of a debate in the Broadland Constituency Labour Party about what the Party should do, but has wider implications.

A political project

For me, membership of the European Union is about values, peace and solidarity with our friends and neighbours. The European Union is probably the most ambitious political project ever attempted. It set out to create a community of shared values, among countries of widely differing sizes and cultures, operating in 24 official languages. Above all it set out to prevent Europe sliding back into the internal warfare which had been the norm for centuries, culminating in the horrors of two twentieth century wars. Since its creation we have seen the establishment of democracy across all the member states, and the longest period of peace in Europe since the Roman Empire. No one under 80 today has any real experience of what it was like to live with war, and we have come to think of peace as normal: it is not: we live in an increasingly dangerous world, where we need friends, not enemies.

One of the strategies of the Brexit campaigners, over the decades they have been fighting the battle, is to claim that the EU is fundamentally an economic union, and can therefore be judged by economic outcomes: a weighing of costs and benefits. But this is a (deliberate) mistake.

The EU was founded on a set of fundamentally social democratic values. It supports democracy, citizens’ rights, equitable treatment of countries and organisations. Through the EU, the member states agree major, overarching goals for public policy. It recognises the role of government, at regional, national and European levels in regulating markets and ensuring fair treatment for all players. It aims to address big and complex issues which extend beyond the boundaries of nation states, like climate, demographic, technological and industrial change. It also aims to make it easy for people throughout the Union to behave as if they were in one country, with no barriers to movement, working and living.

A democratic institution

In any democracy there are competing views, interests and strategies. Good governance depends on maintaining a delicate balance between majority and minority interests, and between member states and the collective Union. Of course, it cannot always satisfy everyone. Complex compromises are essential. Sometimes this involves long implementation timescales, sometimes exceptions are made for individual member states. Reaching agreement with all the parties and countries can be mind numbingly slow and tedious, but is still better than war. Inevitably disputes arise about the interpretation of EU laws and regulations, and The European Court of Justice (to which each member state appoints a judge) exists to adjudicate on such disputes.

Negotiating and agreeing solutions involves complex work by the EU’s civil service, the Commission (which is a relatively small for the size of the task: about the size of a middle sized UK Government Department). Sometimes the Commission funds research to understand the challenges and possible solutions.  Where solutions call for significant legislation or regulation, the decisions are taken jointly by the member states (through the Council), and the elected Parliament. To pass, legislation must be supported by a majority of countries, representing a majority of the population, as well as a majority in the Parliament. Over time, the processes and institutions have evolved to increase transparency, accountability and democratic influence.

The Euro is a special, and difficult issue in the debate on the EU. In retrospect, many believe that it was a mistake to set it up without an accountable democratic system of governance, and the UK was certainly wise to opt out (another example of how the EU can adapt to a particular nation’s issues). The result has been inappropriate lending policies followed by the imposition of punitive regulations on some member states. These problems have been exacerbated by the economic crisis of 2008 (not the fault of the EU), and as a result, public confidence in the Euro, and the EU as a whole has been badly shaken. Those who criticise the lack of democratic accountability in the management of the Euro have a case, but the Euro is not the EU.

Losing our influence

Since we voted to join the European Economic Community in 1975, the UK has always been one of the most influential members. Because it is the third largest country by population, very few significant decisions are taken without UK support, usually in alliance with Germany and France. On issues of particular sensitivity to the UK we have been given special treatment (exclusion from the Schengen Agreement on free movement, and from the Euro, and a large rebate on our notional subscriptions). British diplomats, lawyers and civil servants have a high reputation and significant roles in the workings of the EU. When the Lisbon Treaty established the role of High Representative on Foreign Affairs (to speak for the EU on international issues) the first appointee was a British Labour politician. It is ironic that it was a British lawyer who drafted Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, with the aim of appeasing the right wing of the British Conservative Party.

The suggestion that the UK has no influence over laws and regulations is a myth. Between 1999 and 2016, the EU passed 2592 laws. In the Council of Ministers, the UK voted in favour of 95% of these (2466). The level of disagreement is, of course, higher than this, since drafts are only presented to Parliament and the Council after lengthy diplomatic preliminary work, where some ideas are removed before even being published. UK Ministers have sometimes voted against the majority of elected UK MEPs.

The EU’s evolving mission

Meanwhile, the EU continues to evolve, and will go on doing so after/if the UK leaves.  The Union has agreed a set of ten future policy priorities:

  • Jobs, growth and investment
  • Digital single market
  • Energy union and climate
  • Internal market
  • Deeper and fairer economic and monetary union
  • A balanced and progressive trade policy to harness globalisation
  • Justice and fundamental rights
  • Migration
  • A stronger global actor
  • Democratic change

All of these issues matter to the UK, and to the electorate who voted in the referendum. If we stay within the EU, we would have the opportunity to influence the direction of these policies. Outside, we have no voice, but the EU will move on without us. For the last 43 years we have been “rule makers” in EU policy, and if we leave we will necessarily become “rule takers”, since our economy depends so heavily of the EU, There is no option to ignore the policies of the EU. We are 60 million, the 27 countries are 440 million. It is absurd to think that we will continue to have as much influence over the issues which matter most to us after Brexit as we have now.

In 2019 elections will be held for the European Parliament. If Brexit goes ahead, the UK’s parliamentary seats will be redistributed among the other member states, and we will lose our democratic voice.

The EU and the member states

The EU is a collaborative club of member states, who join for mutual benefit, and agree to contribute to the costs. The success of the common enterprise depends on everyone playing by the rules, but being prepared to tolerate compromises to meet the particular needs of individual states.

What is not negotiable is commitment to the “four freedoms” (freedom of movement of goods, services, money and people) which gives equal rights to all citizens, companies and organisations, and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, which adjudicates in disputes.

If any member state refuses to abide by these rules, it acquires an unfair advantage over the other members, which is precisely what the Union was created to avoid. It is therefore essential to the survival of the entire enterprise that no country breaks these rules. The EU has no interest in “punishing” the UK if it leaves, but it cannot reasonably be expected to agree to the UK having an unfair advantage over its members. If everyone leaves the club and expects to keep the benefits, there is no longer a club!

What did people vote for?

The Brexit referendum offered a simple binary choice. Campaigners on both side offered visions of the consequences of leaving or remaining, but most of this was inevitably speculation, and much was exaggerated. In a real sense, no one could know what they were voting for.

Opinion polls since have tried to investigate what people thought they were voting for, and the picture is not at all clear. Some thought it was primarily about immigration, while others prioritised “control” (though whose control over what was much less clear). One significant poll shortly after the referendum illustrates the problem. When asked whether people would prioritise remaining in the Single Market over controlling immigration, the balance was 2:1 in favour of remaining in the Single Market: a policy which the Government has repeatedly rejected.

What outcomes are possible?

In principle there can only be four outcomes from the Brexit negotiations:

“No deal”

meets the requirement to honour the referendum result, but it is inconceivable, and no one seriously believes that it will happen. If all existing agreements and treaties lapsed on 29th March 2019, there would be no legal authority to adjudicate in disputes between the UK and the rest of the EU, and businesses would be unlikely to risk operating across the border. Air traffic would stop, existing EU contracts would be in limbo, imports of medical isotopes for cancer treatment would stop, and financial services based in the UK would no longer be able to do business in the rest of the EU. The Irish border would be closed, with a threat to political stability. The legal status and rights of UK citizens living in the EU, and EU citizens living in the UK would be unclear. World Trade Organisation tariffs would be introduced immediately on UK exports to the EU (and probably EU imports to the UK), causing major delays at ports, given the need for large numbers of additional customs checks. Import delays would provoke serious food shortages. If businesses believed that this was at all likely, the emergency plans required to protect their commercial interests might cause significant unemployment and social disruption.

Soft Brexit

can also meet the requirement to “leave”, though Brexit campaigners differ in what compromises they would accept. There are several variants of “soft Brexit” (including Norway, Canada, Switzerland), but all involve “cherry picking” which bits of EU rules and institutions we remain in, and what we pay for the privilege. All depend on the willingness of the other member states to agree, and all require us to renounce our seats on the Council, Parliament, Commission and Court of Justice, and to give up our votes on laws, regulations and the future direction of the Union. To continue to cooperate on issues like medicines, crime and air traffic we would need to create a large number of new institutions to parallel those which we are members of as members of the EU. We would need to create a new body to adjudicate in disputes, to replace the ECJ. Any realistic version of “soft Brexit” would thus be very expensive to implement and while it would satisfy the requirement to “leave”, it would not actually increase control over anything significant.

Stop Brexit

is still an option, but would clearly not honour the expectations of those who voted for Brexit. Up until 29th March 2019, the UK can withdraw its notice to leave, and return to its previous status. The UK would retain unrestricted access to the EU market, and benefit from the EU’s trade agreements with 70 odd other countries either agreed or in active negotiation. In return it must continue to contribute to the budget and subscribe to the four freedoms. Although Parliament has the constitutional right to decide to stop the Brexit process, it is unlikely to do so for fear of punishment by the electorate for abandoning the “will of the people”. It therefore requires either a substantial change in public opinion (which is not yet evident) or a new mandate (through a general election or a new referendum on the terms on offer).

Leave and return.

The UK might decide to leave the EU on one of the bases listed above, and then, after some years, change its mind. Opinion polling suggests that public opinion is quite likely to support this, since opposition to membership is far greater among older people. However, under EU law, the UK would have to apply like any new applicant state, and abide by the rules. This would probably require us to join Schengen and the Euro, and lose the current budget rebate. This would be a very expensive option.

The Labour Party’s policy

Finally, a comment on the parochial interests of the UK Labour Party. The last two years have shown the extraordinary irresponsibility of the British Conservative Party, prepared to put at risk the UK’s economy, social welfare and standing in the world (all issues they claim to care about), to deal with an internal party squabble. Once again, they have demonstrated that retaining control of government in the party interest outbids any national interest. Against this, the Labour Party needs to be a strong voice for what is best for the UK as a whole. This should be a principled position, not based on our chances of tipping out a weak and divided government, desirable as that is.

Respected legal opinion is that nothing in the 2017 Labour Manifesto is prohibited by EU laws. Where there is any doubt, our chances of changing things are greater as members than as outsiders. It is also clear that there are many things that some on the political right would like that are prevented by membership. Freedom from EU laws and regulations would enable a Conservative UK government to repeal legislation protecting workers’, citizens’, and consumers’ rights. It would also protect us from the EU’s plans to regulate tax havens. It is not a coincidence that the leave campaign was led and funded by some of the richest people in the country, and supported by print media owned by tax exiles.

Conclusion

The referendum was limited, but legitimate. Although only 37% of the electorate voted leave, people were told that that a simple majority of those voting would be sufficient result, and 52% of them chose leave. They were told conflicting things about whether the result would be binding on the government, and about what leaving might mean. Only when the current negotiations are complete will anyone know what the real choice is.
Parliament has the constitutional right to stop Brexit when it sees the result of the negotiation, but to do so would be politically dangerous, not only for parties and MPs but for social cohesion and the national interest. I therefore believe that Parliament requires a new mandate on the terms actually available. This could be achieved by:

  • a general election where the parties took distinct clear positions, for and against Brexit on the terms negotiated
  • a general election where one party at least campaigned for a referendum on the terms negotiated
  • a referendum on the terms negotiated, without a general election

Each of these has risks and advantages, but to allow this government, with no Parliamentary majority, to put the future of our security, economy and rights at risk to resolve internal party disputes would be the height of irresponsibility.

The clock is ticking. The terms must be clear by October to allow them to be ratified by the other member states. Any of these three options is likely to require some extension of the Article 50 period beyond March 2019, and the other member states might be sympathetic to agreeing this, since most of them would prefer us to remain members, However, this causes problems for the European Parliament elections due in May 2019. It is vital, in the national interest, that the Labour Party makes its position as clear as possible, as quickly as possible.

Its our future: give us the choice!

In a democracy, we elect a Government, and if we don’t like what they do, we vote them out.
Leaving the European Union is not like that: once we have left, its over for us, our children and grandchildren, so it is important to get it right.
Since the Referendum, people have seen how complicated it is to leave the EU. Although many people simply want the Government to “get on with it”, a growing number are having second thoughts, and think we should have a vote on the final deal.
When we voted in the Referendum the choice was simple – “leave” or “remain”. But what “leave” meant could not be clear, since no country has ever left before. With a “soft Brexit” we would carry on much as before, but just give up our voting rights and the protection of the European Court of Justice. With a “hard Brexit” we would break all our ties, which almost all experts (whether they are “remainers” or “leavers”) think would be disastrous for our living standards and quality of life.
The Government hopes for something in between. It believes that it can negotiate a deal with most of the advantages of membership and few of the costs. The other 27 countries have repeatedly made it quite clear that they will not agree to this – if you leave a club you give up the right to make the rules. In the first round of negotiation, the UK Government has had to accept almost all the proposals made by the EU, on money, citizens’ rights and the Irish border. It is likely that the second phase will go the same way.
It is now clear that if we want to continue to trade with the countries of the EU (who represent around half of our international trade) there will be a price. We will lose our vote on European laws and regulations, but will still have to abide by many of them. Immigration will probably not fall, because our economy needs more nurses, doctors, chefs, and fruit pickers than we have here. We will still have to contribute to the EU budget as a price of keeping the benefits of free trade. We will lose the right to travel freely across Europe, the protection of our human rights, and a host of other benefits from free healthcare in Europe to access to nuclear isotopes for medical use.
Membership of the EU has been good for Britain, and we have been very influential in European policy and legislation. The EU has helped secure peace across the member states for the first time for centuries. It has given us environmental protection, and high standards for food and consumer products. European regulations, and the adjudication of the European Court of Justice have ensured that UK businesses can compete on a level playing field with their European competitors, and that individuals are protected against unfair treatment by employers and their own government. Its funding programmes have invested in the poorest communities in Britain to support growth and development, when our own Government did not.
Most of the problems we face, and which probably provoked the “leave” vote, were caused by our Governments, not by “Europe”. The massive growth in inequality of wealth and income was a result of our own Government’s failure to manage the economy and taxation. Under the rules of the EU (which we helped create) we could have supported our steel industry, maintained a nationalised railway, and prevented privatisation in the NHS. Within the EU’s rules on “free movement” we could have managed migration by people who do not find employment, in the way that many other EU countries do – our Government chose not to do so.
Since the Referendum it has become clear that the Government wants to “take back control” of our laws and borders, but to give that control, not to voters, or to our elected MPs, but to the Executive. Theresa May has repeatedly tried to bypass our elected MPs, resisting attempts to allow Parliament to vote on Brexit strategy, and hiding the Government’s own analysis of the effects of Brexit. This is not democracy.
For this reason, groups of concerned citizens across the UK have been coming together to campaign for a referendum on the deal which our Government negotiates, with a clear option to decide that the deal on offer will be worse for Britain and its people that staying in the EU (it is ironic that the people who will benefit most from staying in, are in the areas which voted most strongly to leave).
However, we live in a democracy, and if there is a clear vote in favour of leaving on the terms which the Government negotiates, I would accept that decision. What is unacceptable is for a Government without a Parliamentary majority to decide what is best for us.

My team: right or wrong

Why are people not changing their minds as the difficulties of Brexit become increasingly clear?

Since the referendum, exit negotiations have made almost no progress, and the Government is increasingly in disarray, with Ministers and MPs quarrelling about what they want, and what it might mean. Public dissatisfaction with progress has risen substantially, with a clear majority believing that the negotiations are being badly handled.

Yet public opinion remains stubbornly unchanged on the central issue. Those who voted to leave remain leavers, and many of those who voted remain accept the “will of the people” and believe that Brexit should happen, even if they believe it will be an economic and/or a social disaster.

Yet the “will of the people” is a lie, amplified by the passionate Brexiters and through the right wing press. Three quarters of the population (including those too young to vote, who will be most affected) did not vote for Brexit. Two thirds of the electorate did not vote for Brexit (either by voting against or not voting at all). Those who did vote divided almost equally between leavers and remainers, with a very small margin in favour of leave. A minority of MPs voted for Brexit, and two thirds of Labour supporters and voters did so.

It is also clear that those who did vote for Brexit did so for a wide range of, often incompatible, reasons, and the Government has already conceded that many of these will not be achieved. Immigration will not fall, because the economy and public services depend heavily on immigrant labour. There will not be more money for public services, since all commentators agree that the short term effect will be an economic contraction, as we see with UK growth falling behind the rest of the EU. “Control” by the people or by Parliament will not be increased, as we lose our MEPs and our seat on the Council of the EU, which will continue to set the rules for much of our trade, and the Government centralises power in the hands of Ministers. We will not see an expansion of trade  with the rest of the world, as we struggle to renegotiate (from a position of weakness) the many trade deals which we are party to as EU members.

What is the explanation for this effective support for Brexit, despite the fact that it  is increasingly difficult to do?

Firstly, most people do not understand much about the EU, and do not care much about it. Until two years ago, when opinion polls asked about what issues concern people, Europe always figured low down the list, far below the NHS, housing, schools, and employment. During the referendum campaign the EU rose up the list, but it has now returned to its previous low place. So until the referendum people took little interest. The achievement of the leave campaigners was to harness these other concerns to the idea of the EU, and persuade people that leaving the EU would in some way solve these problems, despite the fact that the EU has little or no impact on any of them.

Because most people know little, and care little, about the EU per se, when forced to take a simple yes/no position their decision was more emotional than rational.  Because it was a binary choice, people came to see it as like a football match in which one side wins and the other loses. And like football supporters, they feel they have chosen their team, and they support it, even when it is badly managed, and constantly defeated. True supporters do not abandon their team just because it loses matches.

This is why evidence of the difficulties and the losses we might face from Brexit carry no weight. Opponents at home, or in the rest of Europe, are seen as an enemy to be defeated (despite the Government’s rhetoric about “friends and partners”). Evidence of failure is seen as a new challenge to be fought against, not an argument for compromise. What the leavers want, with a passion, is to leave, whatever that might mean, and they are quite willing to accept changes in policy in the interests of winning.  It seems that many, perhaps most, leavers will accept continued migration, devaluation and economic decline, perhaps even unemployment, in order to win. Furthermore, they have been repeatedly told, and they believe, that they represent the will of the people: all right thinking people are on their side, and the rest are traitors.

This presents all political parties with a challenge. Because the referendum was set up on a simple majority of those voting, and a marginal majority has come to be seen as the will of the people, they feel (wrongly in my view) that it would be undemocratic to resist. So ardent, and no so ardent, remainers support leaving as “democratic”. For the large majority of professional politicians (who were remainers), the task has become to find a solution which demonstrates that we have “left” while doing the least social, economic, and diplomatic damage.

For the Conservatives this involves appeasing the extreme Brexiters, who for a range of ideological and personal reasons seriously want to leave. Although they remain a minority of Conservative MPs, and probably Conservative members, they will be constantly alert to betrayal, and they do understand the detail on issues they care about. With the right wing media, they will cry foul at the first opportunity, particularly if this fits with personal career advancement.

For the Labour Party the problem is different. Because the public opinion contest is not a rational one, anything which looks like resisting the will of the people will be seen (however spuriously) as betrayal of democracy.  Despite the fact that a clear majority of members, supporters and MPs were remainers, and probably a majority remain so, the dangers of appearing to reject a democratic vote are seen as too great. Hence the current position, to repeat endlessly that we are leaving, while trying to ensure that we travel the shortest possible distance from membership. The risk is that the endless repetition of accepting the will of the people reinforces the belief that leaving is the will of the people, when this is plainly untrue. It is appeasing bullies.

The hope for Labour remainers is that somehow public opinion will shift to stopping Brexit, but the evidence is slim, for the reasons I have outlined. People have taken sides, and will die rather than admit that they were wrong.

So what would a Labour minimal Brexit look like? We would remain, for at least a “transition” period and perhaps indefinitely, in the single market and the customs union, because of the huge trade advantages, and because this is the only way of resolving the Irish border problem. This would require us to retain free movement of people and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, membership of most or all of the host of collaborative and regulatory institutions like the Medicines Agency, and continue to contribute to the budget. The Government has already conceded that the volume of migration will not change, we will simply have “control”. Historically, the UK has chosen not to use the controls on movement which are available to it. As Belgium and Luxembourg demonstrate, “free movement” does not mean uncontrolled free movement, or unlimited access to housing or welfare benefits. The ECJ is a totemic issue for the far right, but most people care little about it. As long as we trade with the EU at all we will need a system to adjudicate on disputes, and it would be wasteful to create a parallel court to shadow the ECJ on this. On the budget, most people have no conception of the numbers: that our current contribution is tiny as a proportion of Government spending. Most will accept with a shrug a “divorce settlement” of £60bn rather that £20bn, since these are numbers beyond individual comprehension, and the scope for fudging over time is considerable.

The great and sad irony, is that the one thing we must do to demonstrate that we have left, is resign our formal democratic influence on the EU, its policies and rules. It is inconceivable that people will accept a Brexit which retains our seats on the Parliament and the Council. So we give up our position as one of the “big three” nations, without whose consent little has happened in the EU until now, and become “rule takers” like Norway, obliged to implement rules which we have no say in formulating. When this becomes clear, it might be the tipping point when people recognise this nonsense for what it is. It might be too late.

After the Election – the 2017 Fabian Society Annual Conference

On 8th July 2017 the Fabian Society held its annual summer conference, attended by some 200 Fabian members. The event focused on the 2017 election, the manifesto, the campaign and lessons for the future, especially in relation to Brexit and Housing. These notes reflect my personal interests, and are certainly not a coherent account of the whole conference.

Fine keynote by Yvette Cooper, and especially interesting contributions by Lisa Nandy, Seema Malhotra and Emma Burnell.

The Election

We did not win, but we did well, partly because the Tories lost, with a disastrous campaign.

Hostility to the Tories was a strong factor, and the fact that no one expected us to win

Remember 130 seats swung from Labour to Conservative

We had a strong manifesto, we offered hope, and support for public services

We had a leader who presented passion, decency, authenticity (though the Corby effect is ambiguous – some voted for him, some voted despite him)

Because no one expected us to win, we were not subjected to thorough scrutiny, especially on the economics – this will not happen again!

We held the factions together around a shared manifesto, and avoided fragmenting and infighting

The result polarised constituencies substantially with the erosion of the minor parties. Seats where one party has more than 50% of the votes increased dramatically between 2015 and 2017. Tory seats from 52% to 77% and Labour seats from 46% to 85%.

There is no simple explanation of individual results – the largest Labour majorities were in Bristol West and Knowsley!

Leadership was a paradoxical issue – in focus groups, half of people said that they voted because of Corbyn, but half voted despite him

Parliament is more diverse than ever before. 45% of Labour MPs are women, there are 27 BAME MPs, and we have the largest ever proportion of “out” LGBT MPs.

The result has already reversed Tory policies on several issues – grammar schools, foxhunting, winter fuel, Northern Ireland abortion

The Manifesto

The manifesto was put together in a hurry, not all was thought through.

It was better at demonstrating our values and direction of travel than as a detailed plan – not all could be addressed in one Parliament, not all was affordable

Focus group evidence shows that the manifesto worked – people liked hope rather than fear.

They noticed our policies on Tuition Fees and Bank Holidays! They remembered the Tories for the U-turn on the “dementia tax” (the U-turn more than the policy itself) and foxhunting.

Tuition fee policy was popular among parents and grandparents, not just the young.

Our manifesto was weak on welfare and the poor

there was debate about the proposal to abolish Student Loans (though note Andrew Adonis’ Guardian article supporting abandoning loans). Is this the priority at this point? If the rationale for loans is that graduates should contribute because the degree leads to higher earnings, then raising income tax on the top 5% of earnings is a simpler and more rational policy, than forcing debt on people 75% of whom will never repay in full.

The new campaign

We remain on an election footing, though opinion varies on how soon that will be.

We need to keep the spirit of the Manifesto, but develop the arguments better, strengthen on welfare.

Attach hope to a viable programme for government

Focus on equipping people to deal with an uncertain future

Talk a language that people understand (most people think “the market” is where you buy your vegetables!)

Andy Harrop’s five priorities:

  1. We need to attract “left conservatives” – left on economics but socially conservative
  2. We need to build on our good result in Scotland
  3. We need to campaign (again) “in poetry” but be better prepared to govern “in prose” (we did the first well)
  4. We need a story on Brexit
  5. We need to be civil, inclusive and united.

Yvette Cooper’s four priorities:

  1. Hold the new voters and go beyond them. Bear in mind the electorate is volatile (a high proportion of 2017 Labour voters had never voted Labour before)
  2. Chart a progressive story about Brexit
  3. Address the divide between cities (overwhelmingly Labour, remainer, educated) and Towns
  4. Prioritise a kinder, gentler, democratic politics. Avoid negative campaigning

Address older voters – we now have a majority of voters in all age groups under 45

Address C2s – our weakest social class

Talk up our track record

Continue to make the Tories look bad – Parliamentary opposition important

Demonstrate the competence of the whole team

Remain united.

Brexit

Much debate, but general view is that it is likely to happen, and that opposing in principle now wins no votes.

Party/Starmer policy was clever. Labour is the safest home for remainers, and not hostile to leavers. The LibDem policy of direct opposition merely provokes resistance, and has not convinced the remainers that it is feasible.

We accept the referendum result, but are clear about what people need – the six points. People did not vote to become poorer, but that is certainly what they will get.

Starmer’s six red lines command support from remainers and leavers (and much of this was promised by leavers during the campaign!)

Now is not the time to become the “Remain” party, but the time may come (?). Telling people they were wrong or stupid does not change minds. Public opinion may be changing (poll and focus group evidence not clear) and may change further as negotiations proceed.

Closing our borders may well drive up “illegal” immigration, which will drive down wages and conditions faster than current migration does.

The EU

Brexit is not the main concern of the EU – they have other more pressing issues to worry about, including the kinds of reform what we wanted to see, which they are pushing ahead with.

The 27 remain incredulous, but resigned to Brexit. They still think we are deluded about what we can get out of it, and the strength of our negotiating position.

Despite recent results in Austria, Netherlands and France social democracy is in retreat across the EU – the European left sees the UK 2017 result is seen as a beacon of hope.

There is agreement on the need for reform, but the Euro makes this (even more) difficult

Housing

Housing is a major issue – some think the biggest issue for the next election

All three forms of tenure (owner occupation, social housing and private rented), are in crisis.

Government policy to expand demand merely inflates prices

We need to shift from income taxes to land/wealth taxes

Does housing affordability map onto voting behaviour – a research question?