Tag Archives: democracy

What next on Brexit?

During the last year, my thinking about our relationship with the European Union has been evolving. I remain convinced that leaving is a major act of political, social, and economic self harm (in that order), which will damage most many of those who voted to leave. This is a (long) account of my views. I have written it against the background of a debate in the Broadland Constituency Labour Party about what the Party should do, but has wider implications.

A political project

For me, membership of the European Union is about values, peace and solidarity with our friends and neighbours. The European Union is probably the most ambitious political project ever attempted. It set out to create a community of shared values, among countries of widely differing sizes and cultures, operating in 24 official languages. Above all it set out to prevent Europe sliding back into the internal warfare which had been the norm for centuries, culminating in the horrors of two twentieth century wars. Since its creation we have seen the establishment of democracy across all the member states, and the longest period of peace in Europe since the Roman Empire. No one under 80 today has any real experience of what it was like to live with war, and we have come to think of peace as normal: it is not: we live in an increasingly dangerous world, where we need friends, not enemies.

One of the strategies of the Brexit campaigners, over the decades they have been fighting the battle, is to claim that the EU is fundamentally an economic union, and can therefore be judged by economic outcomes: a weighing of costs and benefits. But this is a (deliberate) mistake.

The EU was founded on a set of fundamentally social democratic values. It supports democracy, citizens’ rights, equitable treatment of countries and organisations. Through the EU, the member states agree major, overarching goals for public policy. It recognises the role of government, at regional, national and European levels in regulating markets and ensuring fair treatment for all players. It aims to address big and complex issues which extend beyond the boundaries of nation states, like climate, demographic, technological and industrial change. It also aims to make it easy for people throughout the Union to behave as if they were in one country, with no barriers to movement, working and living.

A democratic institution

In any democracy there are competing views, interests and strategies. Good governance depends on maintaining a delicate balance between majority and minority interests, and between member states and the collective Union. Of course, it cannot always satisfy everyone. Complex compromises are essential. Sometimes this involves long implementation timescales, sometimes exceptions are made for individual member states. Reaching agreement with all the parties and countries can be mind numbingly slow and tedious, but is still better than war. Inevitably disputes arise about the interpretation of EU laws and regulations, and The European Court of Justice (to which each member state appoints a judge) exists to adjudicate on such disputes.

Negotiating and agreeing solutions involves complex work by the EU’s civil service, the Commission (which is a relatively small for the size of the task: about the size of a middle sized UK Government Department). Sometimes the Commission funds research to understand the challenges and possible solutions.  Where solutions call for significant legislation or regulation, the decisions are taken jointly by the member states (through the Council), and the elected Parliament. To pass, legislation must be supported by a majority of countries, representing a majority of the population, as well as a majority in the Parliament. Over time, the processes and institutions have evolved to increase transparency, accountability and democratic influence.

The Euro is a special, and difficult issue in the debate on the EU. In retrospect, many believe that it was a mistake to set it up without an accountable democratic system of governance, and the UK was certainly wise to opt out (another example of how the EU can adapt to a particular nation’s issues). The result has been inappropriate lending policies followed by the imposition of punitive regulations on some member states. These problems have been exacerbated by the economic crisis of 2008 (not the fault of the EU), and as a result, public confidence in the Euro, and the EU as a whole has been badly shaken. Those who criticise the lack of democratic accountability in the management of the Euro have a case, but the Euro is not the EU.

Losing our influence

Since we voted to join the European Economic Community in 1975, the UK has always been one of the most influential members. Because it is the third largest country by population, very few significant decisions are taken without UK support, usually in alliance with Germany and France. On issues of particular sensitivity to the UK we have been given special treatment (exclusion from the Schengen Agreement on free movement, and from the Euro, and a large rebate on our notional subscriptions). British diplomats, lawyers and civil servants have a high reputation and significant roles in the workings of the EU. When the Lisbon Treaty established the role of High Representative on Foreign Affairs (to speak for the EU on international issues) the first appointee was a British Labour politician. It is ironic that it was a British lawyer who drafted Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, with the aim of appeasing the right wing of the British Conservative Party.

The suggestion that the UK has no influence over laws and regulations is a myth. Between 1999 and 2016, the EU passed 2592 laws. In the Council of Ministers, the UK voted in favour of 95% of these (2466). The level of disagreement is, of course, higher than this, since drafts are only presented to Parliament and the Council after lengthy diplomatic preliminary work, where some ideas are removed before even being published. UK Ministers have sometimes voted against the majority of elected UK MEPs.

The EU’s evolving mission

Meanwhile, the EU continues to evolve, and will go on doing so after/if the UK leaves.  The Union has agreed a set of ten future policy priorities:

  • Jobs, growth and investment
  • Digital single market
  • Energy union and climate
  • Internal market
  • Deeper and fairer economic and monetary union
  • A balanced and progressive trade policy to harness globalisation
  • Justice and fundamental rights
  • Migration
  • A stronger global actor
  • Democratic change

All of these issues matter to the UK, and to the electorate who voted in the referendum. If we stay within the EU, we would have the opportunity to influence the direction of these policies. Outside, we have no voice, but the EU will move on without us. For the last 43 years we have been “rule makers” in EU policy, and if we leave we will necessarily become “rule takers”, since our economy depends so heavily of the EU, There is no option to ignore the policies of the EU. We are 60 million, the 27 countries are 440 million. It is absurd to think that we will continue to have as much influence over the issues which matter most to us after Brexit as we have now.

In 2019 elections will be held for the European Parliament. If Brexit goes ahead, the UK’s parliamentary seats will be redistributed among the other member states, and we will lose our democratic voice.

The EU and the member states

The EU is a collaborative club of member states, who join for mutual benefit, and agree to contribute to the costs. The success of the common enterprise depends on everyone playing by the rules, but being prepared to tolerate compromises to meet the particular needs of individual states.

What is not negotiable is commitment to the “four freedoms” (freedom of movement of goods, services, money and people) which gives equal rights to all citizens, companies and organisations, and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, which adjudicates in disputes.

If any member state refuses to abide by these rules, it acquires an unfair advantage over the other members, which is precisely what the Union was created to avoid. It is therefore essential to the survival of the entire enterprise that no country breaks these rules. The EU has no interest in “punishing” the UK if it leaves, but it cannot reasonably be expected to agree to the UK having an unfair advantage over its members. If everyone leaves the club and expects to keep the benefits, there is no longer a club!

What did people vote for?

The Brexit referendum offered a simple binary choice. Campaigners on both side offered visions of the consequences of leaving or remaining, but most of this was inevitably speculation, and much was exaggerated. In a real sense, no one could know what they were voting for.

Opinion polls since have tried to investigate what people thought they were voting for, and the picture is not at all clear. Some thought it was primarily about immigration, while others prioritised “control” (though whose control over what was much less clear). One significant poll shortly after the referendum illustrates the problem. When asked whether people would prioritise remaining in the Single Market over controlling immigration, the balance was 2:1 in favour of remaining in the Single Market: a policy which the Government has repeatedly rejected.

What outcomes are possible?

In principle there can only be four outcomes from the Brexit negotiations:

“No deal”

meets the requirement to honour the referendum result, but it is inconceivable, and no one seriously believes that it will happen. If all existing agreements and treaties lapsed on 29th March 2019, there would be no legal authority to adjudicate in disputes between the UK and the rest of the EU, and businesses would be unlikely to risk operating across the border. Air traffic would stop, existing EU contracts would be in limbo, imports of medical isotopes for cancer treatment would stop, and financial services based in the UK would no longer be able to do business in the rest of the EU. The Irish border would be closed, with a threat to political stability. The legal status and rights of UK citizens living in the EU, and EU citizens living in the UK would be unclear. World Trade Organisation tariffs would be introduced immediately on UK exports to the EU (and probably EU imports to the UK), causing major delays at ports, given the need for large numbers of additional customs checks. Import delays would provoke serious food shortages. If businesses believed that this was at all likely, the emergency plans required to protect their commercial interests might cause significant unemployment and social disruption.

Soft Brexit

can also meet the requirement to “leave”, though Brexit campaigners differ in what compromises they would accept. There are several variants of “soft Brexit” (including Norway, Canada, Switzerland), but all involve “cherry picking” which bits of EU rules and institutions we remain in, and what we pay for the privilege. All depend on the willingness of the other member states to agree, and all require us to renounce our seats on the Council, Parliament, Commission and Court of Justice, and to give up our votes on laws, regulations and the future direction of the Union. To continue to cooperate on issues like medicines, crime and air traffic we would need to create a large number of new institutions to parallel those which we are members of as members of the EU. We would need to create a new body to adjudicate in disputes, to replace the ECJ. Any realistic version of “soft Brexit” would thus be very expensive to implement and while it would satisfy the requirement to “leave”, it would not actually increase control over anything significant.

Stop Brexit

is still an option, but would clearly not honour the expectations of those who voted for Brexit. Up until 29th March 2019, the UK can withdraw its notice to leave, and return to its previous status. The UK would retain unrestricted access to the EU market, and benefit from the EU’s trade agreements with 70 odd other countries either agreed or in active negotiation. In return it must continue to contribute to the budget and subscribe to the four freedoms. Although Parliament has the constitutional right to decide to stop the Brexit process, it is unlikely to do so for fear of punishment by the electorate for abandoning the “will of the people”. It therefore requires either a substantial change in public opinion (which is not yet evident) or a new mandate (through a general election or a new referendum on the terms on offer).

Leave and return.

The UK might decide to leave the EU on one of the bases listed above, and then, after some years, change its mind. Opinion polling suggests that public opinion is quite likely to support this, since opposition to membership is far greater among older people. However, under EU law, the UK would have to apply like any new applicant state, and abide by the rules. This would probably require us to join Schengen and the Euro, and lose the current budget rebate. This would be a very expensive option.

The Labour Party’s policy

Finally, a comment on the parochial interests of the UK Labour Party. The last two years have shown the extraordinary irresponsibility of the British Conservative Party, prepared to put at risk the UK’s economy, social welfare and standing in the world (all issues they claim to care about), to deal with an internal party squabble. Once again, they have demonstrated that retaining control of government in the party interest outbids any national interest. Against this, the Labour Party needs to be a strong voice for what is best for the UK as a whole. This should be a principled position, not based on our chances of tipping out a weak and divided government, desirable as that is.

Respected legal opinion is that nothing in the 2017 Labour Manifesto is prohibited by EU laws. Where there is any doubt, our chances of changing things are greater as members than as outsiders. It is also clear that there are many things that some on the political right would like that are prevented by membership. Freedom from EU laws and regulations would enable a Conservative UK government to repeal legislation protecting workers’, citizens’, and consumers’ rights. It would also protect us from the EU’s plans to regulate tax havens. It is not a coincidence that the leave campaign was led and funded by some of the richest people in the country, and supported by print media owned by tax exiles.

Conclusion

The referendum was limited, but legitimate. Although only 37% of the electorate voted leave, people were told that that a simple majority of those voting would be sufficient result, and 52% of them chose leave. They were told conflicting things about whether the result would be binding on the government, and about what leaving might mean. Only when the current negotiations are complete will anyone know what the real choice is.
Parliament has the constitutional right to stop Brexit when it sees the result of the negotiation, but to do so would be politically dangerous, not only for parties and MPs but for social cohesion and the national interest. I therefore believe that Parliament requires a new mandate on the terms actually available. This could be achieved by:

  • a general election where the parties took distinct clear positions, for and against Brexit on the terms negotiated
  • a general election where one party at least campaigned for a referendum on the terms negotiated
  • a referendum on the terms negotiated, without a general election

Each of these has risks and advantages, but to allow this government, with no Parliamentary majority, to put the future of our security, economy and rights at risk to resolve internal party disputes would be the height of irresponsibility.

The clock is ticking. The terms must be clear by October to allow them to be ratified by the other member states. Any of these three options is likely to require some extension of the Article 50 period beyond March 2019, and the other member states might be sympathetic to agreeing this, since most of them would prefer us to remain members, However, this causes problems for the European Parliament elections due in May 2019. It is vital, in the national interest, that the Labour Party makes its position as clear as possible, as quickly as possible.

Its our future: give us the choice!

In a democracy, we elect a Government, and if we don’t like what they do, we vote them out.
Leaving the European Union is not like that: once we have left, its over for us, our children and grandchildren, so it is important to get it right.
Since the Referendum, people have seen how complicated it is to leave the EU. Although many people simply want the Government to “get on with it”, a growing number are having second thoughts, and think we should have a vote on the final deal.
When we voted in the Referendum the choice was simple – “leave” or “remain”. But what “leave” meant could not be clear, since no country has ever left before. With a “soft Brexit” we would carry on much as before, but just give up our voting rights and the protection of the European Court of Justice. With a “hard Brexit” we would break all our ties, which almost all experts (whether they are “remainers” or “leavers”) think would be disastrous for our living standards and quality of life.
The Government hopes for something in between. It believes that it can negotiate a deal with most of the advantages of membership and few of the costs. The other 27 countries have repeatedly made it quite clear that they will not agree to this – if you leave a club you give up the right to make the rules. In the first round of negotiation, the UK Government has had to accept almost all the proposals made by the EU, on money, citizens’ rights and the Irish border. It is likely that the second phase will go the same way.
It is now clear that if we want to continue to trade with the countries of the EU (who represent around half of our international trade) there will be a price. We will lose our vote on European laws and regulations, but will still have to abide by many of them. Immigration will probably not fall, because our economy needs more nurses, doctors, chefs, and fruit pickers than we have here. We will still have to contribute to the EU budget as a price of keeping the benefits of free trade. We will lose the right to travel freely across Europe, the protection of our human rights, and a host of other benefits from free healthcare in Europe to access to nuclear isotopes for medical use.
Membership of the EU has been good for Britain, and we have been very influential in European policy and legislation. The EU has helped secure peace across the member states for the first time for centuries. It has given us environmental protection, and high standards for food and consumer products. European regulations, and the adjudication of the European Court of Justice have ensured that UK businesses can compete on a level playing field with their European competitors, and that individuals are protected against unfair treatment by employers and their own government. Its funding programmes have invested in the poorest communities in Britain to support growth and development, when our own Government did not.
Most of the problems we face, and which probably provoked the “leave” vote, were caused by our Governments, not by “Europe”. The massive growth in inequality of wealth and income was a result of our own Government’s failure to manage the economy and taxation. Under the rules of the EU (which we helped create) we could have supported our steel industry, maintained a nationalised railway, and prevented privatisation in the NHS. Within the EU’s rules on “free movement” we could have managed migration by people who do not find employment, in the way that many other EU countries do – our Government chose not to do so.
Since the Referendum it has become clear that the Government wants to “take back control” of our laws and borders, but to give that control, not to voters, or to our elected MPs, but to the Executive. Theresa May has repeatedly tried to bypass our elected MPs, resisting attempts to allow Parliament to vote on Brexit strategy, and hiding the Government’s own analysis of the effects of Brexit. This is not democracy.
For this reason, groups of concerned citizens across the UK have been coming together to campaign for a referendum on the deal which our Government negotiates, with a clear option to decide that the deal on offer will be worse for Britain and its people that staying in the EU (it is ironic that the people who will benefit most from staying in, are in the areas which voted most strongly to leave).
However, we live in a democracy, and if there is a clear vote in favour of leaving on the terms which the Government negotiates, I would accept that decision. What is unacceptable is for a Government without a Parliamentary majority to decide what is best for us.

My team: right or wrong

Why are people not changing their minds as the difficulties of Brexit become increasingly clear?

Since the referendum, exit negotiations have made almost no progress, and the Government is increasingly in disarray, with Ministers and MPs quarrelling about what they want, and what it might mean. Public dissatisfaction with progress has risen substantially, with a clear majority believing that the negotiations are being badly handled.

Yet public opinion remains stubbornly unchanged on the central issue. Those who voted to leave remain leavers, and many of those who voted remain accept the “will of the people” and believe that Brexit should happen, even if they believe it will be an economic and/or a social disaster.

Yet the “will of the people” is a lie, amplified by the passionate Brexiters and through the right wing press. Three quarters of the population (including those too young to vote, who will be most affected) did not vote for Brexit. Two thirds of the electorate did not vote for Brexit (either by voting against or not voting at all). Those who did vote divided almost equally between leavers and remainers, with a very small margin in favour of leave. A minority of MPs voted for Brexit, and two thirds of Labour supporters and voters did so.

It is also clear that those who did vote for Brexit did so for a wide range of, often incompatible, reasons, and the Government has already conceded that many of these will not be achieved. Immigration will not fall, because the economy and public services depend heavily on immigrant labour. There will not be more money for public services, since all commentators agree that the short term effect will be an economic contraction, as we see with UK growth falling behind the rest of the EU. “Control” by the people or by Parliament will not be increased, as we lose our MEPs and our seat on the Council of the EU, which will continue to set the rules for much of our trade, and the Government centralises power in the hands of Ministers. We will not see an expansion of trade  with the rest of the world, as we struggle to renegotiate (from a position of weakness) the many trade deals which we are party to as EU members.

What is the explanation for this effective support for Brexit, despite the fact that it  is increasingly difficult to do?

Firstly, most people do not understand much about the EU, and do not care much about it. Until two years ago, when opinion polls asked about what issues concern people, Europe always figured low down the list, far below the NHS, housing, schools, and employment. During the referendum campaign the EU rose up the list, but it has now returned to its previous low place. So until the referendum people took little interest. The achievement of the leave campaigners was to harness these other concerns to the idea of the EU, and persuade people that leaving the EU would in some way solve these problems, despite the fact that the EU has little or no impact on any of them.

Because most people know little, and care little, about the EU per se, when forced to take a simple yes/no position their decision was more emotional than rational.  Because it was a binary choice, people came to see it as like a football match in which one side wins and the other loses. And like football supporters, they feel they have chosen their team, and they support it, even when it is badly managed, and constantly defeated. True supporters do not abandon their team just because it loses matches.

This is why evidence of the difficulties and the losses we might face from Brexit carry no weight. Opponents at home, or in the rest of Europe, are seen as an enemy to be defeated (despite the Government’s rhetoric about “friends and partners”). Evidence of failure is seen as a new challenge to be fought against, not an argument for compromise. What the leavers want, with a passion, is to leave, whatever that might mean, and they are quite willing to accept changes in policy in the interests of winning.  It seems that many, perhaps most, leavers will accept continued migration, devaluation and economic decline, perhaps even unemployment, in order to win. Furthermore, they have been repeatedly told, and they believe, that they represent the will of the people: all right thinking people are on their side, and the rest are traitors.

This presents all political parties with a challenge. Because the referendum was set up on a simple majority of those voting, and a marginal majority has come to be seen as the will of the people, they feel (wrongly in my view) that it would be undemocratic to resist. So ardent, and no so ardent, remainers support leaving as “democratic”. For the large majority of professional politicians (who were remainers), the task has become to find a solution which demonstrates that we have “left” while doing the least social, economic, and diplomatic damage.

For the Conservatives this involves appeasing the extreme Brexiters, who for a range of ideological and personal reasons seriously want to leave. Although they remain a minority of Conservative MPs, and probably Conservative members, they will be constantly alert to betrayal, and they do understand the detail on issues they care about. With the right wing media, they will cry foul at the first opportunity, particularly if this fits with personal career advancement.

For the Labour Party the problem is different. Because the public opinion contest is not a rational one, anything which looks like resisting the will of the people will be seen (however spuriously) as betrayal of democracy.  Despite the fact that a clear majority of members, supporters and MPs were remainers, and probably a majority remain so, the dangers of appearing to reject a democratic vote are seen as too great. Hence the current position, to repeat endlessly that we are leaving, while trying to ensure that we travel the shortest possible distance from membership. The risk is that the endless repetition of accepting the will of the people reinforces the belief that leaving is the will of the people, when this is plainly untrue. It is appeasing bullies.

The hope for Labour remainers is that somehow public opinion will shift to stopping Brexit, but the evidence is slim, for the reasons I have outlined. People have taken sides, and will die rather than admit that they were wrong.

So what would a Labour minimal Brexit look like? We would remain, for at least a “transition” period and perhaps indefinitely, in the single market and the customs union, because of the huge trade advantages, and because this is the only way of resolving the Irish border problem. This would require us to retain free movement of people and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, membership of most or all of the host of collaborative and regulatory institutions like the Medicines Agency, and continue to contribute to the budget. The Government has already conceded that the volume of migration will not change, we will simply have “control”. Historically, the UK has chosen not to use the controls on movement which are available to it. As Belgium and Luxembourg demonstrate, “free movement” does not mean uncontrolled free movement, or unlimited access to housing or welfare benefits. The ECJ is a totemic issue for the far right, but most people care little about it. As long as we trade with the EU at all we will need a system to adjudicate on disputes, and it would be wasteful to create a parallel court to shadow the ECJ on this. On the budget, most people have no conception of the numbers: that our current contribution is tiny as a proportion of Government spending. Most will accept with a shrug a “divorce settlement” of £60bn rather that £20bn, since these are numbers beyond individual comprehension, and the scope for fudging over time is considerable.

The great and sad irony, is that the one thing we must do to demonstrate that we have left, is resign our formal democratic influence on the EU, its policies and rules. It is inconceivable that people will accept a Brexit which retains our seats on the Parliament and the Council. So we give up our position as one of the “big three” nations, without whose consent little has happened in the EU until now, and become “rule takers” like Norway, obliged to implement rules which we have no say in formulating. When this becomes clear, it might be the tipping point when people recognise this nonsense for what it is. It might be too late.

Five Provocations

Most politics, at national and international levels, operates on the assumption that the world will continue to be broadly as it is, and that the survival of a relatively prosperous, healthy and happy human population can be achieved by modest political interventions (even if these do not always succeed).

There are a number of reasons why this assumption about the future might not be true. Below are five “provocations”. Each is a debatable statement about a long term change, which might fundamentally disrupt our notions of human societies and how they are managed.  They have been developed in the light of conversations with the Norfolk Fabian Society, and some RSA Fellows in Norwich. However, the views are entirely my own. I am not claiming that any of them is necessarily true, and I am well aware that they are all oversimplifications of very complex issues. What I find most interesting, and perhaps under explored, is how they might interact.

Key points:

  • Each has been proposed in some form by serious people, and reflects a large body of theoretical and academic debate, in some case over many years. Each is in a sense a “caricature” for the purposes of debate.
  • They are happening simultaneously and they interact with each other in complex and unpredictable ways.
  • Responding to each of them will require disruptions which will be politically unwelcome, since they threaten the current distribution of resources
  • Responses require solutions which extend beyond the boundaries of nation states, and the timescales of conventional political careers

 

Five Provocations

My question is – are they true, and if so what should “we” do about them.

1.      Work and meaning: what replaces paid work?

Paid employment will cease to be a major part of most people’s lives. Human beings seek meaning and structure. Since the industrial revolution, paid employment has provided this for most people. But within a few decades AI/digitisation/robotics will destroy most of the kinds of work which provide paid employment now, including both manual tasks and those professional roles which depend on large bodies of knowledge and experience. This means that another mechanism will be needed to provide meaning and structure to people’s lives, and a new economic model will be required to share resources fairly. A universal basic income might be that model, but it is difficult to see how we get to it from where we are now.

2.      Artificial intelligence: is it too late to control?

Within the next 50 years AI will outstrip human intelligence. It may already be beyond our control. “Computers” “talk” to each other, they know about us, and “understand” what we say, they access vast and growing bodies of data about the world, they learn from us/each other/experience, they make things, they move, and they program other computers. It is no longer implausible that AI systems will replace or dominate the human species. Some believe that this will happen within the lifetime of people now alive.

3.      The end of capitalism: what will be a new economic model?

Capitalism is dying, but we are not yet aware of it. The deregulation of capitalism led to the crash of 2008. It is doubtful whether political control can be re-established in a way which enables capitalism to survive in its present form. One issue is the way in which technological change in the last 50 years has led to a concentration of wealth which is politically unsustainable in the long term, whatever political system obtains. Globalisation enables the poor to see how the rich live, and they are increasingly unwilling to tolerate it. The non-white, South will demand a fairer share of resources, and will take it, by migration, economic/political pressure, or war. The traditional role of much politics on the left – to defend the interests of workers and disadvantaged groups more generally in the home country, is in clear conflict with the international perspective.

4.      Replacing/reshaping democracy?

The forms of democracy which we have now will not survive. Democracy as we know it developed alongside capitalism, and is failing with it, accelerated by technology. Many of the challenges we face cannot be addressed at the level of the nation state, but international democracy has proved difficult even at the relatively modest level of Europe (the EU is the largest such experiment ever tried)

5.      Growth: can we live within our resources?

The earth does not, and will not, have the resources to enable all its population to have the material living standards which many aspire to (even at the level of the developed Western economies now). Furthermore, climate change is eroding the resources available, as population continues to grow (albeit at a declining rate). Current economic and social models are not sustainable.

All these statements can be challenged in detail. However, the important question is whether they are, in principle plausible, and if so what should we be doing, bearing in mind that many of the kinds of change implied will be deeply unpopular, and many current political trends (both conservative and radical) are intensifying the problems.  One critical issue is how they interact with each other.