Tag Archives: Labour Party

Is Labour running out of time on Brexit

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The Labour Party strategy on Brexit is to wait to see the deal which the government negotiates with the EU, measure it against the “six tests”, and decide whether to support it. This maximises confusion in the Conservative Party and the prospect of a General Election. However, I believe that time is running out, the prospects of an election are very thin, and the Party should be taking a stronger and more public line.

The six tests were all proposed by leading leave campaigners, but it is clear that no possible Brexit agreement can meet them. So the Party will vote against the government’s deal when it comes to Parliament. However, since the Conservatives, with the DUP, have an absolute majority, we will lose and it will go ahead. If there are any rebels, they are likely to cancel each other out. The result will probably be bad, and the Conservatives will have to take the blame, but by then Brexit will be over.

The Labour hope is that the Conservative Party will implode over this, leading to a General Election and a Labour government. However, losing the vote in Parliament does not bring down the government. Under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act a General Election is only called by a two thirds majority for a motion in the Commons, or if the government lose a vote of no confidence and no other leader can form a government. Either way, Labour strategy relies on Tory rebels, voting in the knowledge that they are probably putting Jeremy Corbyn in No 10, and I don’t believe that even the most rabid Brexiters will risk that. That is the gamble that Theresa May has made, and I think she will win.

Meanwhile, the clock ticks on. At the end of March next year we will crash out of the EU unless one of three things happens:

  • A deal is agreed. The most likely deal now is going to be a version of the Norway agreement. People will be told that it is “real” Brexit, and many will accept that. However, it will not satisfy hard Brexiters, nor those Remainers who care about the UK’s votes and influence.
  • The Article 50 notice is withdrawn. This is legally possible, but Parliament is unlikely to risk doing this for fear of appearing to defy “the will of the people”, unless a referendum has given authority.
  • The EU agree to an extension of the Article 50 period This is only likely to be acceptable to the EU if they can see a prospect that we might decide to remain.

Virtually all MPs, and all interested parties in the UK and the rest of the EU agree that crashing out would be catastrophic, but the UK government claims to be preparing for it, and some commentators in Europe are beginning to think it is the only, or simplest, solution (since they already have systems in place for working with third countries).
The longer this takes, the less likely a deal (including remaining in the EU) is. There are a number of severe constraints:

  • There are 8 months left (including the dead summer holiday period, the party conference season and Christmas).
  • The EU says that 6 months are needed for ratification of any deal by the 30+ Parliaments and the institutions of the EU.
  • A UK General Election requires weeks of preparation, and is difficult to hold in mid-winter.
  • A Referendum requires at least two months for campaigning.
  • In May there are elections for the European Parliament. The UK’s seats have already been distributed among the 27. Withdrawing Article 50 would severely disrupt the process.

Theresa May is gambling that the threat of a Corbyn government will, in the end, keep her MPs in line, and that if she drags the process out long enough, the only feasible option will be to accept a soft, Norway style deal. By delaying taking a clear stand, Labour risks us falling into that by default. Is that what we believe is best for the country, and the people?

The Labour Party position on Brexit

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On 19th May, Keir Starmer, Shadow Secretary of State for Brexit spoke at the Fabian Society Summer Conference. I found this the clearest and most explicable account I have read of the Labour Party’s position, and for the first time I felt I understood the logic behind it – even if I disagree with it.
The key points are that the Labour Party:

– is concentrating on supporting the Lords amendments which give control back to Parliament.
– remains committed to its six tests of the Brexit deal (all of which have been promised by Theresa May), and will vote against the motion to approve the deal if it fails to meet them.
– is not supporting the People’s Vote campaign, because the timescales make it impractical, and polling suggests it might deliver a divisive and inconclusive result.

However, nothing is ruled out, since things can change rapidly.

My full note is at: The Labour position Fabians May 18 web

What next on Brexit?

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During the last year, my thinking about our relationship with the European Union has been evolving. I remain convinced that leaving is a major act of political, social, and economic self harm (in that order), which will damage most many of those who voted to leave. This is a (long) account of my views. I have written it against the background of a debate in the Broadland Constituency Labour Party about what the Party should do, but has wider implications.

A political project

For me, membership of the European Union is about values, peace and solidarity with our friends and neighbours. The European Union is probably the most ambitious political project ever attempted. It set out to create a community of shared values, among countries of widely differing sizes and cultures, operating in 24 official languages. Above all it set out to prevent Europe sliding back into the internal warfare which had been the norm for centuries, culminating in the horrors of two twentieth century wars. Since its creation we have seen the establishment of democracy across all the member states, and the longest period of peace in Europe since the Roman Empire. No one under 80 today has any real experience of what it was like to live with war, and we have come to think of peace as normal: it is not: we live in an increasingly dangerous world, where we need friends, not enemies.

One of the strategies of the Brexit campaigners, over the decades they have been fighting the battle, is to claim that the EU is fundamentally an economic union, and can therefore be judged by economic outcomes: a weighing of costs and benefits. But this is a (deliberate) mistake.

The EU was founded on a set of fundamentally social democratic values. It supports democracy, citizens’ rights, equitable treatment of countries and organisations. Through the EU, the member states agree major, overarching goals for public policy. It recognises the role of government, at regional, national and European levels in regulating markets and ensuring fair treatment for all players. It aims to address big and complex issues which extend beyond the boundaries of nation states, like climate, demographic, technological and industrial change. It also aims to make it easy for people throughout the Union to behave as if they were in one country, with no barriers to movement, working and living.

A democratic institution

In any democracy there are competing views, interests and strategies. Good governance depends on maintaining a delicate balance between majority and minority interests, and between member states and the collective Union. Of course, it cannot always satisfy everyone. Complex compromises are essential. Sometimes this involves long implementation timescales, sometimes exceptions are made for individual member states. Reaching agreement with all the parties and countries can be mind numbingly slow and tedious, but is still better than war. Inevitably disputes arise about the interpretation of EU laws and regulations, and The European Court of Justice (to which each member state appoints a judge) exists to adjudicate on such disputes.

Negotiating and agreeing solutions involves complex work by the EU’s civil service, the Commission (which is a relatively small for the size of the task: about the size of a middle sized UK Government Department). Sometimes the Commission funds research to understand the challenges and possible solutions.  Where solutions call for significant legislation or regulation, the decisions are taken jointly by the member states (through the Council), and the elected Parliament. To pass, legislation must be supported by a majority of countries, representing a majority of the population, as well as a majority in the Parliament. Over time, the processes and institutions have evolved to increase transparency, accountability and democratic influence.

The Euro is a special, and difficult issue in the debate on the EU. In retrospect, many believe that it was a mistake to set it up without an accountable democratic system of governance, and the UK was certainly wise to opt out (another example of how the EU can adapt to a particular nation’s issues). The result has been inappropriate lending policies followed by the imposition of punitive regulations on some member states. These problems have been exacerbated by the economic crisis of 2008 (not the fault of the EU), and as a result, public confidence in the Euro, and the EU as a whole has been badly shaken. Those who criticise the lack of democratic accountability in the management of the Euro have a case, but the Euro is not the EU.

Losing our influence

Since we voted to join the European Economic Community in 1975, the UK has always been one of the most influential members. Because it is the third largest country by population, very few significant decisions are taken without UK support, usually in alliance with Germany and France. On issues of particular sensitivity to the UK we have been given special treatment (exclusion from the Schengen Agreement on free movement, and from the Euro, and a large rebate on our notional subscriptions). British diplomats, lawyers and civil servants have a high reputation and significant roles in the workings of the EU. When the Lisbon Treaty established the role of High Representative on Foreign Affairs (to speak for the EU on international issues) the first appointee was a British Labour politician. It is ironic that it was a British lawyer who drafted Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, with the aim of appeasing the right wing of the British Conservative Party.

The suggestion that the UK has no influence over laws and regulations is a myth. Between 1999 and 2016, the EU passed 2592 laws. In the Council of Ministers, the UK voted in favour of 95% of these (2466). The level of disagreement is, of course, higher than this, since drafts are only presented to Parliament and the Council after lengthy diplomatic preliminary work, where some ideas are removed before even being published. UK Ministers have sometimes voted against the majority of elected UK MEPs.

The EU’s evolving mission

Meanwhile, the EU continues to evolve, and will go on doing so after/if the UK leaves.  The Union has agreed a set of ten future policy priorities:

  • Jobs, growth and investment
  • Digital single market
  • Energy union and climate
  • Internal market
  • Deeper and fairer economic and monetary union
  • A balanced and progressive trade policy to harness globalisation
  • Justice and fundamental rights
  • Migration
  • A stronger global actor
  • Democratic change

All of these issues matter to the UK, and to the electorate who voted in the referendum. If we stay within the EU, we would have the opportunity to influence the direction of these policies. Outside, we have no voice, but the EU will move on without us. For the last 43 years we have been “rule makers” in EU policy, and if we leave we will necessarily become “rule takers”, since our economy depends so heavily of the EU, There is no option to ignore the policies of the EU. We are 60 million, the 27 countries are 440 million. It is absurd to think that we will continue to have as much influence over the issues which matter most to us after Brexit as we have now.

In 2019 elections will be held for the European Parliament. If Brexit goes ahead, the UK’s parliamentary seats will be redistributed among the other member states, and we will lose our democratic voice.

The EU and the member states

The EU is a collaborative club of member states, who join for mutual benefit, and agree to contribute to the costs. The success of the common enterprise depends on everyone playing by the rules, but being prepared to tolerate compromises to meet the particular needs of individual states.

What is not negotiable is commitment to the “four freedoms” (freedom of movement of goods, services, money and people) which gives equal rights to all citizens, companies and organisations, and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, which adjudicates in disputes.

If any member state refuses to abide by these rules, it acquires an unfair advantage over the other members, which is precisely what the Union was created to avoid. It is therefore essential to the survival of the entire enterprise that no country breaks these rules. The EU has no interest in “punishing” the UK if it leaves, but it cannot reasonably be expected to agree to the UK having an unfair advantage over its members. If everyone leaves the club and expects to keep the benefits, there is no longer a club!

What did people vote for?

The Brexit referendum offered a simple binary choice. Campaigners on both side offered visions of the consequences of leaving or remaining, but most of this was inevitably speculation, and much was exaggerated. In a real sense, no one could know what they were voting for.

Opinion polls since have tried to investigate what people thought they were voting for, and the picture is not at all clear. Some thought it was primarily about immigration, while others prioritised “control” (though whose control over what was much less clear). One significant poll shortly after the referendum illustrates the problem. When asked whether people would prioritise remaining in the Single Market over controlling immigration, the balance was 2:1 in favour of remaining in the Single Market: a policy which the Government has repeatedly rejected.

What outcomes are possible?

In principle there can only be four outcomes from the Brexit negotiations:

“No deal”

meets the requirement to honour the referendum result, but it is inconceivable, and no one seriously believes that it will happen. If all existing agreements and treaties lapsed on 29th March 2019, there would be no legal authority to adjudicate in disputes between the UK and the rest of the EU, and businesses would be unlikely to risk operating across the border. Air traffic would stop, existing EU contracts would be in limbo, imports of medical isotopes for cancer treatment would stop, and financial services based in the UK would no longer be able to do business in the rest of the EU. The Irish border would be closed, with a threat to political stability. The legal status and rights of UK citizens living in the EU, and EU citizens living in the UK would be unclear. World Trade Organisation tariffs would be introduced immediately on UK exports to the EU (and probably EU imports to the UK), causing major delays at ports, given the need for large numbers of additional customs checks. Import delays would provoke serious food shortages. If businesses believed that this was at all likely, the emergency plans required to protect their commercial interests might cause significant unemployment and social disruption.

Soft Brexit

can also meet the requirement to “leave”, though Brexit campaigners differ in what compromises they would accept. There are several variants of “soft Brexit” (including Norway, Canada, Switzerland), but all involve “cherry picking” which bits of EU rules and institutions we remain in, and what we pay for the privilege. All depend on the willingness of the other member states to agree, and all require us to renounce our seats on the Council, Parliament, Commission and Court of Justice, and to give up our votes on laws, regulations and the future direction of the Union. To continue to cooperate on issues like medicines, crime and air traffic we would need to create a large number of new institutions to parallel those which we are members of as members of the EU. We would need to create a new body to adjudicate in disputes, to replace the ECJ. Any realistic version of “soft Brexit” would thus be very expensive to implement and while it would satisfy the requirement to “leave”, it would not actually increase control over anything significant.

Stop Brexit

is still an option, but would clearly not honour the expectations of those who voted for Brexit. Up until 29th March 2019, the UK can withdraw its notice to leave, and return to its previous status. The UK would retain unrestricted access to the EU market, and benefit from the EU’s trade agreements with 70 odd other countries either agreed or in active negotiation. In return it must continue to contribute to the budget and subscribe to the four freedoms. Although Parliament has the constitutional right to decide to stop the Brexit process, it is unlikely to do so for fear of punishment by the electorate for abandoning the “will of the people”. It therefore requires either a substantial change in public opinion (which is not yet evident) or a new mandate (through a general election or a new referendum on the terms on offer).

Leave and return.

The UK might decide to leave the EU on one of the bases listed above, and then, after some years, change its mind. Opinion polling suggests that public opinion is quite likely to support this, since opposition to membership is far greater among older people. However, under EU law, the UK would have to apply like any new applicant state, and abide by the rules. This would probably require us to join Schengen and the Euro, and lose the current budget rebate. This would be a very expensive option.

The Labour Party’s policy

Finally, a comment on the parochial interests of the UK Labour Party. The last two years have shown the extraordinary irresponsibility of the British Conservative Party, prepared to put at risk the UK’s economy, social welfare and standing in the world (all issues they claim to care about), to deal with an internal party squabble. Once again, they have demonstrated that retaining control of government in the party interest outbids any national interest. Against this, the Labour Party needs to be a strong voice for what is best for the UK as a whole. This should be a principled position, not based on our chances of tipping out a weak and divided government, desirable as that is.

Respected legal opinion is that nothing in the 2017 Labour Manifesto is prohibited by EU laws. Where there is any doubt, our chances of changing things are greater as members than as outsiders. It is also clear that there are many things that some on the political right would like that are prevented by membership. Freedom from EU laws and regulations would enable a Conservative UK government to repeal legislation protecting workers’, citizens’, and consumers’ rights. It would also protect us from the EU’s plans to regulate tax havens. It is not a coincidence that the leave campaign was led and funded by some of the richest people in the country, and supported by print media owned by tax exiles.

Conclusion

The referendum was limited, but legitimate. Although only 37% of the electorate voted leave, people were told that that a simple majority of those voting would be sufficient result, and 52% of them chose leave. They were told conflicting things about whether the result would be binding on the government, and about what leaving might mean. Only when the current negotiations are complete will anyone know what the real choice is.
Parliament has the constitutional right to stop Brexit when it sees the result of the negotiation, but to do so would be politically dangerous, not only for parties and MPs but for social cohesion and the national interest. I therefore believe that Parliament requires a new mandate on the terms actually available. This could be achieved by:

  • a general election where the parties took distinct clear positions, for and against Brexit on the terms negotiated
  • a general election where one party at least campaigned for a referendum on the terms negotiated
  • a referendum on the terms negotiated, without a general election

Each of these has risks and advantages, but to allow this government, with no Parliamentary majority, to put the future of our security, economy and rights at risk to resolve internal party disputes would be the height of irresponsibility.

The clock is ticking. The terms must be clear by October to allow them to be ratified by the other member states. Any of these three options is likely to require some extension of the Article 50 period beyond March 2019, and the other member states might be sympathetic to agreeing this, since most of them would prefer us to remain members, However, this causes problems for the European Parliament elections due in May 2019. It is vital, in the national interest, that the Labour Party makes its position as clear as possible, as quickly as possible.

My team: right or wrong

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Why are people not changing their minds as the difficulties of Brexit become increasingly clear?

Since the referendum, exit negotiations have made almost no progress, and the Government is increasingly in disarray, with Ministers and MPs quarrelling about what they want, and what it might mean. Public dissatisfaction with progress has risen substantially, with a clear majority believing that the negotiations are being badly handled.

Yet public opinion remains stubbornly unchanged on the central issue. Those who voted to leave remain leavers, and many of those who voted remain accept the “will of the people” and believe that Brexit should happen, even if they believe it will be an economic and/or a social disaster.

Yet the “will of the people” is a lie, amplified by the passionate Brexiters and through the right wing press. Three quarters of the population (including those too young to vote, who will be most affected) did not vote for Brexit. Two thirds of the electorate did not vote for Brexit (either by voting against or not voting at all). Those who did vote divided almost equally between leavers and remainers, with a very small margin in favour of leave. A minority of MPs voted for Brexit, and two thirds of Labour supporters and voters did so.

It is also clear that those who did vote for Brexit did so for a wide range of, often incompatible, reasons, and the Government has already conceded that many of these will not be achieved. Immigration will not fall, because the economy and public services depend heavily on immigrant labour. There will not be more money for public services, since all commentators agree that the short term effect will be an economic contraction, as we see with UK growth falling behind the rest of the EU. “Control” by the people or by Parliament will not be increased, as we lose our MEPs and our seat on the Council of the EU, which will continue to set the rules for much of our trade, and the Government centralises power in the hands of Ministers. We will not see an expansion of trade  with the rest of the world, as we struggle to renegotiate (from a position of weakness) the many trade deals which we are party to as EU members.

What is the explanation for this effective support for Brexit, despite the fact that it  is increasingly difficult to do?

Firstly, most people do not understand much about the EU, and do not care much about it. Until two years ago, when opinion polls asked about what issues concern people, Europe always figured low down the list, far below the NHS, housing, schools, and employment. During the referendum campaign the EU rose up the list, but it has now returned to its previous low place. So until the referendum people took little interest. The achievement of the leave campaigners was to harness these other concerns to the idea of the EU, and persuade people that leaving the EU would in some way solve these problems, despite the fact that the EU has little or no impact on any of them.

Because most people know little, and care little, about the EU per se, when forced to take a simple yes/no position their decision was more emotional than rational.  Because it was a binary choice, people came to see it as like a football match in which one side wins and the other loses. And like football supporters, they feel they have chosen their team, and they support it, even when it is badly managed, and constantly defeated. True supporters do not abandon their team just because it loses matches.

This is why evidence of the difficulties and the losses we might face from Brexit carry no weight. Opponents at home, or in the rest of Europe, are seen as an enemy to be defeated (despite the Government’s rhetoric about “friends and partners”). Evidence of failure is seen as a new challenge to be fought against, not an argument for compromise. What the leavers want, with a passion, is to leave, whatever that might mean, and they are quite willing to accept changes in policy in the interests of winning.  It seems that many, perhaps most, leavers will accept continued migration, devaluation and economic decline, perhaps even unemployment, in order to win. Furthermore, they have been repeatedly told, and they believe, that they represent the will of the people: all right thinking people are on their side, and the rest are traitors.

This presents all political parties with a challenge. Because the referendum was set up on a simple majority of those voting, and a marginal majority has come to be seen as the will of the people, they feel (wrongly in my view) that it would be undemocratic to resist. So ardent, and no so ardent, remainers support leaving as “democratic”. For the large majority of professional politicians (who were remainers), the task has become to find a solution which demonstrates that we have “left” while doing the least social, economic, and diplomatic damage.

For the Conservatives this involves appeasing the extreme Brexiters, who for a range of ideological and personal reasons seriously want to leave. Although they remain a minority of Conservative MPs, and probably Conservative members, they will be constantly alert to betrayal, and they do understand the detail on issues they care about. With the right wing media, they will cry foul at the first opportunity, particularly if this fits with personal career advancement.

For the Labour Party the problem is different. Because the public opinion contest is not a rational one, anything which looks like resisting the will of the people will be seen (however spuriously) as betrayal of democracy.  Despite the fact that a clear majority of members, supporters and MPs were remainers, and probably a majority remain so, the dangers of appearing to reject a democratic vote are seen as too great. Hence the current position, to repeat endlessly that we are leaving, while trying to ensure that we travel the shortest possible distance from membership. The risk is that the endless repetition of accepting the will of the people reinforces the belief that leaving is the will of the people, when this is plainly untrue. It is appeasing bullies.

The hope for Labour remainers is that somehow public opinion will shift to stopping Brexit, but the evidence is slim, for the reasons I have outlined. People have taken sides, and will die rather than admit that they were wrong.

So what would a Labour minimal Brexit look like? We would remain, for at least a “transition” period and perhaps indefinitely, in the single market and the customs union, because of the huge trade advantages, and because this is the only way of resolving the Irish border problem. This would require us to retain free movement of people and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, membership of most or all of the host of collaborative and regulatory institutions like the Medicines Agency, and continue to contribute to the budget. The Government has already conceded that the volume of migration will not change, we will simply have “control”. Historically, the UK has chosen not to use the controls on movement which are available to it. As Belgium and Luxembourg demonstrate, “free movement” does not mean uncontrolled free movement, or unlimited access to housing or welfare benefits. The ECJ is a totemic issue for the far right, but most people care little about it. As long as we trade with the EU at all we will need a system to adjudicate on disputes, and it would be wasteful to create a parallel court to shadow the ECJ on this. On the budget, most people have no conception of the numbers: that our current contribution is tiny as a proportion of Government spending. Most will accept with a shrug a “divorce settlement” of £60bn rather that £20bn, since these are numbers beyond individual comprehension, and the scope for fudging over time is considerable.

The great and sad irony, is that the one thing we must do to demonstrate that we have left, is resign our formal democratic influence on the EU, its policies and rules. It is inconceivable that people will accept a Brexit which retains our seats on the Parliament and the Council. So we give up our position as one of the “big three” nations, without whose consent little has happened in the EU until now, and become “rule takers” like Norway, obliged to implement rules which we have no say in formulating. When this becomes clear, it might be the tipping point when people recognise this nonsense for what it is. It might be too late.

After the Election – the 2017 Fabian Society Annual Conference

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On 8th July 2017 the Fabian Society held its annual summer conference, attended by some 200 Fabian members. The event focused on the 2017 election, the manifesto, the campaign and lessons for the future, especially in relation to Brexit and Housing. These notes reflect my personal interests, and are certainly not a coherent account of the whole conference.

Fine keynote by Yvette Cooper, and especially interesting contributions by Lisa Nandy, Seema Malhotra and Emma Burnell.

The Election

We did not win, but we did well, partly because the Tories lost, with a disastrous campaign.

Hostility to the Tories was a strong factor, and the fact that no one expected us to win

Remember 130 seats swung from Labour to Conservative

We had a strong manifesto, we offered hope, and support for public services

We had a leader who presented passion, decency, authenticity (though the Corby effect is ambiguous – some voted for him, some voted despite him)

Because no one expected us to win, we were not subjected to thorough scrutiny, especially on the economics – this will not happen again!

We held the factions together around a shared manifesto, and avoided fragmenting and infighting

The result polarised constituencies substantially with the erosion of the minor parties. Seats where one party has more than 50% of the votes increased dramatically between 2015 and 2017. Tory seats from 52% to 77% and Labour seats from 46% to 85%.

There is no simple explanation of individual results – the largest Labour majorities were in Bristol West and Knowsley!

Leadership was a paradoxical issue – in focus groups, half of people said that they voted because of Corbyn, but half voted despite him

Parliament is more diverse than ever before. 45% of Labour MPs are women, there are 27 BAME MPs, and we have the largest ever proportion of “out” LGBT MPs.

The result has already reversed Tory policies on several issues – grammar schools, foxhunting, winter fuel, Northern Ireland abortion

The Manifesto

The manifesto was put together in a hurry, not all was thought through.

It was better at demonstrating our values and direction of travel than as a detailed plan – not all could be addressed in one Parliament, not all was affordable

Focus group evidence shows that the manifesto worked – people liked hope rather than fear.

They noticed our policies on Tuition Fees and Bank Holidays! They remembered the Tories for the U-turn on the “dementia tax” (the U-turn more than the policy itself) and foxhunting.

Tuition fee policy was popular among parents and grandparents, not just the young.

Our manifesto was weak on welfare and the poor

there was debate about the proposal to abolish Student Loans (though note Andrew Adonis’ Guardian article supporting abandoning loans). Is this the priority at this point? If the rationale for loans is that graduates should contribute because the degree leads to higher earnings, then raising income tax on the top 5% of earnings is a simpler and more rational policy, than forcing debt on people 75% of whom will never repay in full.

The new campaign

We remain on an election footing, though opinion varies on how soon that will be.

We need to keep the spirit of the Manifesto, but develop the arguments better, strengthen on welfare.

Attach hope to a viable programme for government

Focus on equipping people to deal with an uncertain future

Talk a language that people understand (most people think “the market” is where you buy your vegetables!)

Andy Harrop’s five priorities:

  1. We need to attract “left conservatives” – left on economics but socially conservative
  2. We need to build on our good result in Scotland
  3. We need to campaign (again) “in poetry” but be better prepared to govern “in prose” (we did the first well)
  4. We need a story on Brexit
  5. We need to be civil, inclusive and united.

Yvette Cooper’s four priorities:

  1. Hold the new voters and go beyond them. Bear in mind the electorate is volatile (a high proportion of 2017 Labour voters had never voted Labour before)
  2. Chart a progressive story about Brexit
  3. Address the divide between cities (overwhelmingly Labour, remainer, educated) and Towns
  4. Prioritise a kinder, gentler, democratic politics. Avoid negative campaigning

Address older voters – we now have a majority of voters in all age groups under 45

Address C2s – our weakest social class

Talk up our track record

Continue to make the Tories look bad – Parliamentary opposition important

Demonstrate the competence of the whole team

Remain united.

Brexit

Much debate, but general view is that it is likely to happen, and that opposing in principle now wins no votes.

Party/Starmer policy was clever. Labour is the safest home for remainers, and not hostile to leavers. The LibDem policy of direct opposition merely provokes resistance, and has not convinced the remainers that it is feasible.

We accept the referendum result, but are clear about what people need – the six points. People did not vote to become poorer, but that is certainly what they will get.

Starmer’s six red lines command support from remainers and leavers (and much of this was promised by leavers during the campaign!)

Now is not the time to become the “Remain” party, but the time may come (?). Telling people they were wrong or stupid does not change minds. Public opinion may be changing (poll and focus group evidence not clear) and may change further as negotiations proceed.

Closing our borders may well drive up “illegal” immigration, which will drive down wages and conditions faster than current migration does.

The EU

Brexit is not the main concern of the EU – they have other more pressing issues to worry about, including the kinds of reform what we wanted to see, which they are pushing ahead with.

The 27 remain incredulous, but resigned to Brexit. They still think we are deluded about what we can get out of it, and the strength of our negotiating position.

Despite recent results in Austria, Netherlands and France social democracy is in retreat across the EU – the European left sees the UK 2017 result is seen as a beacon of hope.

There is agreement on the need for reform, but the Euro makes this (even more) difficult

Housing

Housing is a major issue – some think the biggest issue for the next election

All three forms of tenure (owner occupation, social housing and private rented), are in crisis.

Government policy to expand demand merely inflates prices

We need to shift from income taxes to land/wealth taxes

Does housing affordability map onto voting behaviour – a research question?

What to do about Jeremy Corbyn?

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I have been a member of the Labour Party intermittently since 1970. I left, like many people, over Iraq, and only rejoined when the 2010 election approached. Now we find ourselves with a real dilemma over the leadership. Three candidates are arguing, in varying ways, that we lost in 2015 because we were too far to the “left” (whatever that means these days – not much to most voters I suspect). For them, we will only win, and thus have the power to change things if we aim for the middle ground – accepting much of the Conservative agenda – but transforming it with a human face.

The alternative is proposed by Jeremy Corbyn, whose position is regarded as extreme left in a UK context (where debate is dominated by a right leaning media). However, his politics would be seen as unremarkable in most European countries.  Certainly, I see little which I would disagree with in principle – “austerity” was a deliberate choice, not a necessity. The financial crisis and its sequel has proved that capitalism in its present form is irrecoverably broken, and is certainly incapable of serving the needs of most people. Corbyn’s proposals are quite consistent with the views of many orthodox economists, and represent a step forward, not, as many of his opponents suggest, a step backwards. Although I am passionately attached to the European project, I can understand his reservations about our membership of the EU – if what the EU has done to Greece is the real Europe, I don’t want to be part of it, and the Cameron “renegotiation” is, if it is anything, about pushing it further down that road.!

To caricature, the choice we are offered is between abandoning our principles to gain power, and hoping then to do some good; or saying what we believe and having faith that the electorate will be inspired by a radical vision of the future. Certainly, every time I hear a Labour politician explaining how we must move closer to the Conservatives in order to win power, I lean further towards Corbyn.

My view, after having a few of the 5 million “conversations” of which we were so proud in the election campaign, is that people could not see that we were offering a significant alternative. People were not happy, many were very angry, but saw no evidence that we were offering anything really different. We were too timid to say how bold some of our thinking was, we offered a vast menu of good but confusing policies, and refused to defend the very creditable record of Labour in Government (which included rescuing the economy from a near catastrophe – George Osborne inherited a growing economy, and stopped it dead!).

Corbyn offers a bold and radical challenge to this position. What’s more he has extraordinary charisma and authenticity. Unlike most Westminster politicians, and Labour leaders in the last election, he gives every sign of believing what he says, and because of this he deals with real confidence with the journalists traps. I suspect he would do well in the formal confrontations with David Cameron, and would appeal to many people, on left and right, who are looking for a credible radical alternative. As Laurie Penny commented in the New Statesman “the argument that Jeremy Corbyn is unelectable is being made by three candidates who can’t even win against Jeremy Corbyn”.

However, it is difficult to see him as leader of the party. He wants to restore democracy to the party (which I support) but how will he lead such a party when it votes (as its MPs are likely to do), against his plans? What are the risks of a leader with no Ministerial experience? How can a leader with his record of dissent unify a party, especially after a divisive leadership campaign.

I have my ballot paper, but I suspect I will not be the only person who will not be posting it until September